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CALCULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A STOCK
DIVIDEND BETWEEN-LIFE TENANT
AND CORPUS
Jo Hr LEwis EVANS
Much uncertainty and confusion exists among the members
of the bar and trust officers in regard to the ascertainment of the
amount to which a life tenant is entitled when a corporation has
declared a stock dividend. The writer believes that the existing
uncertainty and confusion has been caused chiefly by the mathe-
matical calculations as prescribed by the Supreme Court.' The
purpose of this article is to make an analysis of these calculations
and to state certain general conclusions that can be drawn there-
from.
As the subject of this paper is the calculations by which the
rule is applied rather than the rule itself, we will not discuss the
decisions by which the rule was formulated and its application
gradually extended. But we will start with a short quotation
from the leading case in which the rule was first stated.
In Earp's Appeal the Supreme Court said:
"The distribution of it [the corporate surplus] among
the stockholders in the form of new certificates has no effect
whatever upon the equitable right to it. It makes no kind
of difference whether this fund is secured by 540 or 1350
certificates. Its character cannot be changed by the evi-
dence given to secure it. Part of it is principal-the rest
is 'income,' within the meaning of the will. The principal
must remain unimpaired during the lives of the appellants
[the life tenants] and the 'income' arising since the death
of the testator is to be distributed among them." 2
This is generally known as the American rule and has been
adopted in most of the states. It seems to be generally conceded
that the rule is theoretically correct in its attempt to give the life
IAll references to the Supreme Court are to the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court
-8 Pa. 368, 374 (857).
(981)
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tenant the income and only the income. But the difficulty of ap-
plying the Pennsylvania .rule has influenced many to prefer the
Massachusetts rule, which is frankly a rule of convenience and
gives cash dividends to the life tenant and stock dividends to
the corpus. This paper is an effort to justify a theoretically cor-
rect rule of law, by a practical discussion of the method of its
application, in the hope of removing some of the uncertainty and
confusion which we believe everyone feels when first studying
the mathematical calculations by which the rule has been applied
in the past.
The rule has been applied to an extraordinary cash dividend,
to a stock dividend and to dividends in voluntary liquidation. In
Nirdlinger's Rstate,3 the Supreme Court extended the rule to a
case where a trustee has realized a profit by selling the stock held
by the trust, the court holding that in such a case the life tenant
was entitled to so much of the profits as represented the income
or eainings of the corporation since the acquisition of the stock.
It has also been stated by the Supreme Court that the rule applies
to the case of rights to subscribe.
The Supreme Court has many times said that the rule is
based on an effort to give the income to the life tenant as di-
rected by the will and that the question is one of applying equi-
ties as between life tenant and remainderman. While the direc-
tors of a corporation have reasonable discretion in determining
what portion of the surplus will be distributed to the stockholders
by the regular dividends, their action in withholding a portion
of the income or earnings from distribution cannot affect the
relative rights of life tenant and remainderman to such surplus
income or earnings. In equity the life tenant is the real owner
of the income or earnings and the remainderman is the real
owner of the principal of the fund. When there has been any
distribution of the assets of the corporation to stockholders
(other than by a regular dividend to which the rule does not
apply at all), whether by action of the directors or by action of
the trustee in selling the stock, the apportionment between life
829o Pa. 457, i3g AtI. 2oo (1927). See Note (1928) 76 U. oF PA. L. REv.
589.
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tenant and corpus does not depend upon the manner in which
the directors have used the surplus income or earnings prior to
its liquidation, nor upon accounting methods, nor upon the name
that the directors have given to the excess earnings or income,
nor upon the form that the directors have used in declaring the
extraordinary dividend. The apportionment depends solely on
the equities between life tenant and remainderman resulting from
the testator's direction that the income should be given to the
life tenant.
So much for the rule itself, as so enunciated by the Supreme
Court and generally accepted as theoretically reasonable. It is
in the application of the rule and in the performance of the
mathematical calculations that difficulty and confusion arise.
Prior to 1926 when Dickinsons Estate 4 was decided, the
rule was applied to the case of a stock dividend in the following
manner. The value of the trustee's holdings when the stock was
acquired is first ascertained and then the value of the original
shares immediately after the declaration of the stock dividend.
If the latter figure is less than the former, a sufficient amount
from the stock dividend is awarded to the corpus, which, when
added to the value of the original shares immediately after the
declaration of the stock dividend will equal the value of the
shares when they were acquired. The rest of the stock dividend
is awarded to the life tenant.
Dickinson's Estate introduced another factor into the cal-
culations. It involved a stock dividend of the Fire Association
of Philadelphia. The evidence showed that the book value of
the trustee's holdings at the time of their acquisition was less than
their book value after the distribution of the stock dividend, so
that under the application of the rule which we have just de-
scribed, the whole stock dividend would have been awarded to the
life tenant. But there was also evidence of two transactions
which was held to necessitate a change in the application of the
rule. First, the San Francisco fire occurred during the period
and the resulting loss caused a large decrease in the book value
'285 Pa. 449, 132 AtI. 352 (1926).
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of the assets. Secondly, the Fire Association sold two blocks of
new stock, realizing considerably more than the par value of the
stock sold, which resulted in a large increase in the assets and
added $112.50 to the book value of each of the trustee's shares.
The court held that both of these were principal transactions as
between life tenant and remainderman; and that the fire loss must
be deducted from and the gain on the sale of the stock must be
added to the intrinsic value of the trustee's stock at the time of
its acquisition, in order to ascertain the intact value that must be
preserved for the remainderman. When this was done the cal-
culations proceeded as in the previous cases.5
The principle decided in Dickinson's Estate was reaffirmed
in Packer's Estate,6 and the method of calculation was thus re-
stated:
"In making it [the distribution of the stock dividend],
there should always be awarded to the corpus of the trust
such a number of the shares included in the dividend as,
with the shares upon which the dividend was declared, at
the actual or intact value of the two after the stock dividend
is declared and paid, will aggregate exactly the same sum
as the actual or intact value of the original shares at the
time the trust acquired them, plus any capital increase there-
after paid to the corporation on account of those shares,
and less a proportionate part of any capital losses properly
chargeable against them." 7
It has been held that this method of application of the rule
applies to extraordinary cash dividends, to rights to subscribe
and to dividends in liquidation, as well as to stock dividends.
An entirely different method of calculation was -laid down
in lAirdlinger's Estate to apply the rule to the apportionment be-
The method in -which the Supreme Court charged the San Francisco fire
loss against the corpus of the estate, so that it should not be charged against
the income or earnings during the life tenancy, was criticized in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Kephart. See Note (E926) 74 U. or P.. L. REv. 68.
Whether or not the dissenting opinion would lead to more accurate results, the
general principle decided by this branch of Dickinson's Estate is undoubtedly
as we have stated it above.
6 291 Pa. 194, 139 Atl. 867 (1927).
" Supra note 6, at 197, 139 AtI. at 867.
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tween life tenant and remainderman of the profit realized by the
trustee by the sale of the stock:
"From what we have said, it follows that where the
trustee sells stock which represents in part accumulated earn-
ings sufficiently ear marked that they can be ascertained, the
life tenants are entitled to an apportionment of these earn-
ings, not in any manner reducing the intact value of the
corpus." 8
We therefore have two distinct and apparently. different
methods of calculation by which we must apply the Pennsylvania
rule to the two different situations. The purpose of this paper
is to analyze these two methods of calculation for the purpose
of ascertaining whether either of them can be simplified, whether
both of them can be reduced to a single formula and whether
any helpful general conclusions can be formed. We will start
with the calculations applicable to a stock dividend.
The first factor to be analyzed is the value of the assets of
the corporation. In Earp's Appeal 0 the only evidence of value
was the market value of the stock at the date of the acquisition
of the stock and the market value of the stock after the declara-
tion of the stock dividend. The Supreme Court has receitly,
quite properly we think, discarded market value as a factor,10
and we can dismiss such a value.
We are left with book value and intrinsic value. The Su-
preme Court has many times said that the intrinsic value of the
assets is the real figure that should be used for the purposes of
the calculation and they have thus left it open for life tenant or
remainderman in the future to investigate and prove particular
cases where the intrinsic value of the assets differs from the book
value. But as far as the practical application of the rule is con-
cerned, we have found no case where the properly proved book
value of the assets was rejected by the Supreme Court. On the
contrary, an examination of the record in all the recent Su-
B Sopra note 3, at 475, i39 AtI. at 2G7.
0Snpra, note 2.
" Packer's Estate, supra note 6, at 197, x39 AtI. at 867; Jones v. Integrity
Trust Co., -292 Pa. 149, x55, 14o At. 862, 864 (1928).
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preme Court decisions on extraordinary dividends shows that in
each case the book value was the only value of which there was
any evidence." We can, therefore, assume that the book value
of the assets is prima facie evidence of their intrinsic value, and
we can analyze the calculations on the basis of book value.
The book value of the assets of a corporation is obtained
from its balance sheet, which is formed by assembling the bal-
ances in all of the primary accounts of the corporation.
On the debit or asset side are the assets of the corporation
at their respective book values.
On the credit or liabilities side there are the following:
i. The liabilities of the corporation.
2. The balance of the capital stock account. This is always
the par value of the outstanding stock. When new stock is issued,
its par value is credited to this account. When old stock is re-
tired, its par value is debited to this account. If new stock is
issued for more than par, the par value is credited to this account
and the excess over par is credited to the surplus account. The
amount received for the stock whether cash or assets of other
kinds is credited to the proper asset account, thereby increasing
the debit or asset side of the balance sheet by exactly the same
amount that the credit or liabilities side has been increased. In
the ordinary case that we are considering, that is, where there
have been no new issues of stock or no retirement of stock be-
tween the time of the acquisition of the stock and the declaration
of the dividend in question, the capital stock account remains
unchanged during the period. When the stock dividend is issued
the par value of the stock is credited to the capital stock account
and charged to the surplus account, no change having been made
in the assets of the corporation.
3. The surplus account. This may be called the profit and
loss account or by some other name. It may consist of two or
more accounts, and in such case, by surplus account we mean a
I Flaccus's Estate 283 Pa. 185, 129 AUt. 74 (x925); Harkness's Estate, 283
Pa. 464, 129 Ad. 458 (1925); Mallory's Estate, 285 Pa. 186, i31 Ad. 714
(1926) ; Dickinsons Estate, supra note 4; Packer's Estate, supra note 6; ]ones
v. Integrity Trust Co., supra note io.
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consolidation of the several accounts in which the surplus is ac-
counted for.
From the balance sheet, it is clear that the net assets of the
corporation (i. e., the assets less the liabilities) always equal the
par value of the outstanding capital stock plus the balance in the
surplus account.
From this fact it follows that if a transaction involving the
assets of the corporation or its liabilities or both does not result
in changing the book value of the net assets, no change is made
in the surplus account. On the other hand any transaction which
increases or decreases the net assets must necessarily increase or
decrease the surplus account.12 Whenever there has been an
increase or a decrease in the net assets there must be a contem-
poraneous credit or charge in the surplus account, and conversely
whenever there is a credit or charge in the surplus account there
must be a corresponding increase or decrease in the net assets. In
all properly kept books, each entry in the surplus account indi-
cates the source of the increase or decrease in the net assets or
refers to a subsidiary account giving this information. There-
fore the surplus account for any period gives a complete account
of all the increases and decreases in the assets during that period.
In addition to the balance sheet accounts, the corporation
generally keeps a separate set of operating accounts which are
periodically closed into surplus account.
The book value of the assets of the corporation at the ac-
quisition of the stock is therefore obtained by preparing a balance
sheet as of that day and by adding, to the par value of the out-
standing capital stock, the balance then standing in the surplus ac-
count.
We have shown that the surplus account contains an appro-
priate entry for every increase or decrease in the book value of
the assets of the corporation. If, therefore, we have the surplus
account from the acquisition of the stock to the declaration of the
dividend, we can ascertain the book value of the assets of the
corporation on the latter date by adding, to the book value of the
=We are now disregarding issuance of new stock or retirement of old
stocks, which present entirely different accounting situations.
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assets at the acquisition of the stock, the total increase in the book
value as shown by the surplus account.
We next come to the amounts which must be added to or
subtracted from the value of the assets at the time of the acquisi-
tion of the stock, in order to determine the value that must be pre-
served for the remainderman, under the formula as stated in
Dickinson's Estate and Packer's Estate. The $11:2.50 per share
that was added in Dickinson's Estate was added because it "was
not income which had accrued on the stock" ;13 and because:
"In no sense could these sums have been considered income;
they were rather profits on the capital investment, which al-
ways belong to capital." 14
The San Francisco fire loss was subtracted, because when
the testator gave to the life tenants:
"'. .. all the income earned after his, testator's death, he
meant just what he said, and hence that gift cannot properly
be cut down, for the benefit of the remainderman, because
the corporation was compelled, in order to meet an extraor-
dinary loss, to use a portion of the surplus which had been
accumulated before testator's death." IS
In this paper we are not directly concerned with the prin-
ciples upon which the court will determine whether, as between
life tenant and remainderman, a particular item in the surplus
account is a principal gain or loss or whether it is income or
earnings. But under Dickinson's Estate this question must be
decided by the court whenever it is raised as to any item by life
tenant or remainderman. And to make a complete application of
the decision in Dickinson's Estate, we must classify all the en-
tries in the surplus account and segregate those which are prin-
cipal accretions or losses from those which are credits to or
charges against income or earnings.
Having done this we find that the book value of the assets
of the corporation at the time of the declaration of the stock divi-
12 Supra note 4, at 453, i3z At. at 353.
Supra note 4, at 455, 132 At. at 354.
'= Supra note 4, at 452, 132 Ati. at 333.
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dend will be the book value at the time of the acquisition of the
stock, plus the capital accretions (or minus capital losses, as the
case may be), plus the income or earnings, in excess of the reg-.
ular dividends paid, during the period.
With this analysis of the various factors involved in the
calculation necessary to ascertain what portion of the stock divi-
dend the life tenant is entitled to, we are ready to analyze the
formula itself. We will state the formula in algebraic form and
then resolve it into its simplest terms.
Let a = the number of shares originally acquired by the
trustee.
b = the number of shares of the corporation outstand-
ing at the time the stock was acquired.
c = the number of shares in the whole stock dividend.
d = the intrinsic value of the assets of the corporation
at the time the stock was acquired.
e = the total capital accretions from the time the stock
was acquired to the declaration of the stock divi-
dend, i. e., the total that must be added to the in-
trinsic value at the time the stock was acquired to
determine the intact value that must be preserved
for the remainderman.
-=the total income or earnings, in excess of the reg-
ular dividends paid, during the same period.
The intact value of each share of the trust which must be
preserved for the remainderman=-- (I).
The intrinsic value of the assets of the corporation at the
declaration of the stock dividend=d+e+j.
The intrinsic value of each share after the declaration of the
stock dividend - d+e+f (n).b+c
The amount that must be awarded to the corpus for each
share of trust in order to preserve the intact value for the remain-
derman - (I) - (H) - d e d+e+f17 b+C"
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The amount that must be awarded to the corpus for its total
holdings =a (d±i doe+f
-b b- fc/
The number of shares of new stock received by thi trustee
acTG- (IV).
The intrinsic value of the whole stock dividend received by
the trustee = (IV) x (II) = (d e+f) (V).
The amount that must be awarded to the life tenant =
(V) - (III) = \ ( -a ( d+ef)
This formula is resolved into its simplest terms as follows:
ac td+e+f a f ~ /~ d
b k b+c /b+C0
a[ . fd+e+f d+e + +f =
[ -b +cc) b b+c e
[c (d+e+) - (b+c) (d+e) + b (d+e+f)1a[c (de ) b (b+c) .1
a [ c+b i = a [I (b+c)l_
[b (b+c)Lb (b+c)] b
This simplified formula, alf, is the total income or earn-
ings, in excess of the regular dividends paid, during the period,
divided by the number of shares of the corporation outstanding
at the time the stock was acquired, multiplied by the number of
shares originally held by the trustee. Whenever we have before
us the complete surplus account from the date of the acquisition
of the stock to the date of the declaration of the stock dividend
we can ascertain the amount to which the life tenant is entitled
by this simple formula, and we have mathematically demonstrated
that this formula will reach exactly the same result as if we had
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followed the elaborate calculations prescribed by Dickinson's
Estate and Packer's Estate.
In the case of an extraordinary cash dividend or of rights
to subscribe, the formula for the amount to be distributed to the
life tenant can be stated in the same manner that we have stated
the formula for a stock dividend; and when these two formulas
are reduced to their simplest terms, we will in each case reach
the same result that we have reached in the case of a stock divi-
dend; namely, that the amount to which the life tenant is entitled
will be aL
We now come to the case in which a trustee has realized a
profit by the sale of the stock, and we find that the calculation by
which we determine the amount to which the life tenant is en-
titled is thus stated in Nirdlinger's Estate:
"From what we have said, it follows that where the
trustee sells stock which represents in part accumulated earn-
ings sufficiently ear marked that they can be ascertained, the
life tenants are entitled to an apportionment of these earn-
ings, not in any manner reducing the intact value of the
corpus." 16
In other words the calculation is precisely the same as the short
cut that we have arrived at for extraordinary dividends;
namely, ab.
We have now reached a uniform method of calculating the
amount to which the life tenant is entitled, applicable to any of
the methods of distribution of corporate surplus which have been
before the courts. And we find that by this method of calcula-
tion we are simply proceeding directly to the ascertainment of
the fundamental fact which lies at the basis of the Pennsylvania
rule and which is thus concisely stated in the opinion in Earp's
Appeal:
"Part of it [the corporate surplus] is principal-the rest is
'income', within the meaning of the will." 17
"Supra note 3, at 475, x39 Ati. at 207.
27 Supra note 2, at 374.
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Are there any general conclusions that can be drawn from
this analysis and then tested as to their general reasonableness?
In the first place the same formula determines the amount to
which the life tenant is entitled, whether the distribution of assets
has been by the declaration of an extraordinary dividend or by
the sale of the stock by the trustee. This certainly seems correct,
as the Supreme Court has held that it is the same rule that applies
to both cases. Also it would be unreasonable to apply a different
formula to these two situations because the amount that the life
tenant should receive depends on how much income or earnings
the corporation had made and not upon the action of the trustee.
In the second place this formula gives to the life tenant the
same amount whether the directors have declared an extraordi-
nary cash dividend, or a stock dividend, or have issued rights
to subscribe, and irrespective of the amount of the cash dividend,
or the number of shares in the stock dividend, or the number of
shares to which the stockholder is given the right to subscribe
(subject, of course, to the qualification that is present in all these
cases; namely, that the life tenant in no event can receive more
than the whole dividend). That this is a reasonable result to
reach is evident.
In the third place if the amount to whikh the life tenant is
entitled can be ascertained by inserting the appropriate figures
in the formula ati, then the book value of the assets at the time
of the acquisition of the stock need not be used at all in the calcu-
lations. It has no effect on the amount to which the life tenant
is entitled. The same thing applies to the book value of the assets
at the time of the declaration of the extraordinary dividend.
Let us see whether the intrinsic value of the assets (where
it differs from the book value) is equally immaterial. If it ap-
pears in a particular case that some asset, which the corporation
owned at the time of the acquisition of the stock, was carried
at a book value less than its intrinsic value, and. there was no
change in the intrinsic value of that asset during the period in
question, it is evident that no change would be made in the amount
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to which the life tenant is entitled, whether this is calculated by
the formula in Packer's Estate or by the formula a. This
Thi
statement could be tested out and proved if space permitted. On
the other hand, if the intrinsic value of a principal asset increases
during the period in question, it immediately becomes necessary
under Dickinson's Estate, and under the method of calculation
laid down in Packer's Estate, for the court to determine whether
this increase is a capital accretion or is income or earnings. We
have no doubt whatever that the Supreme Court would decide
that this was a principal gain and not income or earnings as be-
tween life tenant and remainderman. If such an increase is a
capital accretion, it will be included in e in the working out of the
formula; if it is income or earnings, it will be included in f. But
fwhichever way the court decides this question, the formula aT
will give to the life tenant exactly the same amount as he would
receive under the formula in Packer's Estate. These statements
can also easily be checked up and their accuracy shown.
Therefore by calculating the amount to which the life tenant
is entitled by the formula af, we find it entirely unnecessary to
use either the book value or the intrinsic value of the assets of
the corporation, either at the time of the acquisition of the stock
or at the time of the declaration of the extraordinary dividend or
the sale of the stock. This seems to be entirely reasonable, judging
by the considerations which in the ordinary case of trust manage-
ment determine the question as to whether a particular amount is
principal or income. The value of the principal of the trust fund
(whether market value, book value, or intrinsic value) has no
direct bearing on the question as to whether a particular item
of receipt or expense should be considered as income or principal.
It therefore appears that not only have we evolved a simple
formula and one uniformly applicable to all the situations under
discussion, but we have shown that judging the rule from its real
foundation there is reasonable ground for the exclusion of every
factor used in the formula in Packer's Estate, except those di-
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rectly necessary to ascertain the life tenant's share in the income
or earnings of the corporation during the period.
The use of this formula will immediately eliminate most
of the mathematical difficulties of applying the rule. Nothing but
purely legal questions will be left for lawyers to advise upon and
courts to decide. Having before us the surplus account from
the time of the acquisition of the stock to the time of the dec-
laration of the extraordinary dividend or the sale of the stock,
most of the items therein will easily classify themselves as prin-
cipal or as income. Any doubtful items will be classified upon
the same principles that the Supreme Court applied in Dickin-
son's Estate and in Nirdlinger's Estate and which the courts
must necessarily apply even under the method of calculation
prescribed by Packer's Estate, whenever the particular item be-
comes a subject of dispute between life tenant and remainderman.
The question will immediately arise in the mind of the
reader of this paper: Why has not the Supreme Court adopted
this simple formula. The answer is plain. The formula can
only be used when the court has before it a complete surplus
account from the time of the acquisition of the stock to the time
of the declaration of the extraordinary dividend or the sale of
the stock. And this evidence has never been present in any case
decided by the Supreme Court. Lawyers in preparing stock divi-
dend cases have never presented all the facts to the court. They
have been satisfied with proof of the book value of the assets at
the time of the acquisition of the stock and the book value of
the assets at the declaration of the stock dividend. With this in-
complete evidence it has been necessary for the court to apply
a presumption. It has therefore been held that in the case of the
stock dividend the presumption favors the life tenant, and the
fife tenant receives all the dividend except so much thereof as
the remainderman has proved belongs to the corpus. As the court
has had nothing before it but the book values at the beginning
and at the end of the period, it is clear that the remainderman
has not proved that he is enitled to more than the preservation
of the intrinsic value of the stock at the time of its acquisition.
The complicated and confusing calculations prescribed in Pack-
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er's Estate have therefore resulted from the fact that each lawyer
representing a remainderman has confined himself to introduc-
ing the same evidence that was introduced in the preceding cases.
The Supreme Court has never been- given the full information
which would have enabled them to apply the appropriate equities
between life tenant and remainderman without these elaborate
calculations.
In Nkirdlinger's Estate, when the Pennsylvania rule was
first extended to a sale of the stock by the trustee, the Supreme
Court did exactly the same thing which we are here contending
should be done in the case of the distribution of a stock divi-
dend. They held that the life tenant must ear mark the income
or earnings of the corporation during the period, and he would
then be given, out of the profit realized from the sale of the stock,
his proportionate share of those earnings.
In view of the decision in Dickinson's Estate, any careful
lawyer representing a remainderman must be sure that he has
ascertained every item of increase in the assets which should be
added to the intrinsic value of the stock at the time of its acquisi-
tion, in order to determine the intact value that must be preserved
for the remainderman. The book values at the time of the ac-
quisition of the stock and at the time of the declaration of the
stock dividends do not give him this information. He can only
be sure of this by an inspection of the surplus account, and
when he has picked out of the surplus account all the items which
are principal accretions or losses, all the items left in the surplus
account will constitute income or earnings. The attorney for
the remainderman will then know that the life tenant is entitled
to his proportionate share of the income or earnings and that
the remainderman will get the balance of the stock dividend.
In studying the decisions it has seemed clear to the writer
that, just as soon as the Supreme Court has before it a case in-
cluding the full surplus account from the date of the acquisition
of the stock to the date of the declaration of the extraordinary
dividend or of the sale of the stock, they will find it unneces-
sary to apply a presumption favoring either the life tenant or
the remainderman or to go through the elaborate calculations
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prescribed in Packer's Estate. They will proceed directly to the
determination of the question: How much of the increase in
the assets of the corporation came from principal transactions
and how much was income or earnings.
We have shown that a-l gives the amount to which the
life tenant is entitled under any method of liquidation of sur-
plus. If the liquidation has taken the form of an extraordinary
cash dividend or has been brought about by the sale of the stock,
the trustee has cash in his hands, and the formula shows the
amount of cash to which the life tenant is entitled. When the
liquidation has taken the form of a stock dividend, the trustee
has stock in his hands instead of cash, and the question then
arises as to how mucli of the stock should be given to the life
tenant to represent the amount to which he is entitled.
It would seem that this question should be decided in the
same manner as in any situation where it becomes necessary to
determine how many shares of stock are equivalent to a certain
amount of cash, and that the amount to which the life tenant is
entitled should be divided by the market value of one share of
stock at the time of the declaration of the stock dividend, to as-
certain the number of shares that should be transferred to the
life tenant.
We are not aware of any case in which this matter has been
discussed by the Supreme Court, but the court seems to have de-
cided that the amount to which the life tenant is entitled should
be divided by the book value of the stock rather than by the mar-
ket value. We submit that this cannot be logically justified.
The reason for the Pennsylvania rule is that since the testa-
tor has given the income to the life tenant, he is the equitable
owner of the income or earnings of the corporation during the
life tenancy, even though the corporation has withheld the dis-
tribution of them. As the income is earned by the corporation
in the form of cash, the amount to which the life tenant is entitled
should be figured in cash, and he should be paid in cash or in
something the equivalent of the cash to which he is entitled. To
pay him in stock at its book value, is to establish a rule of law
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which is directly contrary to practical experience and which
makes the value he is to receive depend on the vagaries of the
stock market. To pay him in stock at its market value, gives
him something that he can immediately convert into the amount
of cash to which he is entitled.
If, in the case of a stock dividend, the amount to which the
life tenant is entitled is given him in stock at its book value, we
immediately reach an entirely different result from that reached
in the case of an extraordinary cash dividend or a sale of stock
by the trustee. On December 31, 1928, the book value of Radio
common was $28.32 according to the Standard Corporation Rec-
ords and'its market value was $375, or thirteen times its book
value. If a stock dividend had been declared on that date and
the amount to which a life tenant was entitled had been distrib-
uted in stock at its book value, the life tenant would have re-
ceived thirteen times as much as the income or earnings of the
corporation during the time the trustee held the stock, and thir-
teen times as much as the life tenant would have received if the
corporation had declared an extraordinary cash dividend. If the
trustee, anticipating a stock dividend, had sold the stock, he would
thereby have caused the life tenant to receive one-thirteenth as
much as if he had waited and received the new stock and distrib-
uted to the life tenant at book value.
The market value of Radio common increased from $288
to $375 between November I6th and December 3ist-an in-
crease of thirty per cent. If a stock dividend had been declared
on December 3ist and the stock was distributed to the life tenant
at its book value, the life tenant would have received thirty per
cent. more than if the dividend had been declared on November
i6th and distributed in the same manner. The absurdities of
these results of paying to the life tenant the income to which
he is entitled in stock at its book value is evident.
When the Supreme Court rejected market value in favor
of book value they were dealing with figures to be used for the
purpose of comparing the assets of the corporation at the time
of the acquisition of the stock, with the assets at the time of the
declaration of the extraordinary dividend; they were engaged in
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ascertaining how much the assets had increased during the life
tenancy. It will be seen immediately that the preference for book
value as against market value for such a purpose is based upon
a real reason. On the other hand, when the court has definitely
ascertained the amount of income or earnings of the corporation
between the time of the acquisition of the stock and the time of
the declaration of the extraordinary dividend, and it is neces-
sary to ascertain how the life tenant's share in this income should
be given to him, an entirely different question is presented.
When the Supreme Court has before it a stock dividend
case with the full surplus account of the corporation in the record,
we feel confident that, after ascertaining the life tenant's share
of the income earned during the life tenancy, they will distribute
the stock to him at its market value. But, however this question
is decided, it does not affect the principles upon which the court
should determine the life tenant's share of the income earned
during the life tenancy.
In GrahaWm's Estate,'8 recently before the Supreme Court,
there were two succeeding life tenants and the stock dividend
was declared during the second life tenancy. The court below
awarded the whole stock dividend to the second life tenant on
the ground that there could be no apportionment between suc-
cessive life tenants. The executors of the first life tenant took
the appeal. The Supreme Court refused to decide the main
question, holding that there was a presumption that the whole
stock dividend belonged to the life tenant at the time of its dec-
laration and that the executors of the first life tenant had failed
to overcome this presumption. Mr. Justice Kephart said in the
opinion:
" . but there is no evidence to show earnings to the
first life tenant's death, and the value for each share at that
time is not stated. It was thus found by the court below:
'it does not appear whether any of these undivided' profits
were earned in the lifetime of the first beneficiary.' The
stipulation of facts throws no light on the question, and we
cannot reason it from the trial balance submitted. The gain
'No. E29 of January Tern, filed February i, 1929.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF A STOCK DIVIDEND
in surplus does not always represent earnings, as that term
is understood, nor does its mere presentation throw the
burden on the accountant to explain the several items that
make it up. It may not be attribitable solely to the natural
earnings of the stock, but it may in part represent other
items of increase not attributable to stock earnings; it may,
indeed, state enhanced or present-day value of bonds pur-
chased. From this same surplus is properly deductible losses
on account of bad loans or other investments accruing during
the period of the first life-tenancy. Surplus often becomes
in part a matter of bookkeeping, sometimes altogether.
There may be cases where better evidence is not available
or through other circumstances it may be used to establish a
fact, but we are here considering the division of a testator's
property, where the desired course of distribution is in
opposition to a legal presumption. We have no evidence of
earnings, and before the principal question may be consid-
ered we may be met with another question which need not
now be discussed. As it is, any decision on the main point
presented by appellant will not be discussed."
From this quotation from the opinion it appears that the
case was decided upon the failure of the executors of the first
life tenant to prove what portion, if any, of the total increase
in the surplus represented income or earnings during the first life
tenancy. It is clear that the Supreme Court had in mind the
necessity on the part of the first life tenant of proving the com-
plete surplus account during the period involved. This case,
therefore, appears to lend additional authority to the principles
which we have discussed in this article.
